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Introduction 
 The idea that language influences our daily lives has drawn a great deal of attention over 
the last several decades, not least from movements centered around activism, which seek to work 
towards social equality using language’s subjectivities, or the ways in which language, rather 
than having a certain set meaning, serves as a tool for people to create meaning in day-to-day 
communication. This creation of meaning constitutes an ever-changing act that occurs within 
social, political, and historical context. Neither the social impact of language nor feminism has 
individually lacked in recent scholarly attention, but the two fields are not always drawn 
together. This thesis focuses on the intersection of feminism and sociolinguistics in the work of 
French feminists. In particular, I examine the work and ideas of Luce Irigaray, a Belgian-born 
writer, linguist, and psychoanalyst who became well-known for her theories on sexual 
difference, outlined in works such as her 1974 book Speculum de l’autre femme (‘The Speculum 
of the Other Woman’) and Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un (‘The Sex Which is Not One’), published 
in 1977. Irigaray studied first in Belgium at the Catholic University of Leuven, and then in Paris 
at the University of Paris VIII (also known as Vincennes), receiving doctorates in both 
philosophy and linguistics, a background whose influence features prominently in her work. She 
studied under Jaques Lacan, a leading psychoanalyst whose ideas underpinned much of the work 
done by French feminists, though they did not merely adopt Lacanian philosophy uncritically, 
Irigaray included: her second doctoral thesis led to her dismissal from her teaching position at 
the university (Mader). 
My own work will examine the ways in which the philosophical and sociohistorical 
background of the particular time periods and societies in which they worked shaped the writings 
of Irigaray, and of French feminists more generally, as they responded to the particular issues 
	 4 
and patriarchal discourses relevant to their context. As constructionism and Derridean ideas grew 
more significant in the intellectual milieu of France at the time, certain writers saw how they 
could make use of these ideas to explain and dispute the oppression of women in Western 
societies. They pointed out how many of the assumptions made about women were far from 
“natural” truths, and instead had very specific roots in sociopolitical and historical context. They 
particularly focused on the ways that people used language itself, a subjective tool, to construct 
this patriarchal reality, and how changes to language could benefit women. They often made 
reference to sexual difference and other aspects of anatomy or biology, leading many to accuse 
them of essentialism, meaning that they believed a few biological traits of a person- typically, in 
this case, sexual characteristics- make that person who they are, deciding a great deal about that 
person regardless of other context or traits. I, however, argue that these references and 
biologically-centered discussions can in fact be read in an anti-essentialist manner, as the roots of 
French feminism lay in constructionism, and thus French feminists did not ignore context in the 
way that some critics have accused. Instead, readers should interpret the references more 
metaphorically, and as a manner of simply emphasizing a difference between men and women in 
order for these feminists to bring attention to a point of view outside of the dominant patriarchal 
one.  
I then address certain quantitative experiments undertaken by Irigaray as well as the 
concrete proposal of écriture feminine, or feminine writing, a new style of writing intended to 
construct a different type of reality in order to better reflect women’s experiences and allow for 
better communication both among women and between the sexes. I argue that this, too, could be 
initially taken as essentialist, given the implication that women should use an entirely different 
variety of language than men, but in fact only those espousing constructionism would believe 
	 5 
that changing one’s style of language would also bring about a change in the nature of one’s 
reality, as the idea that language constructs reality must underpin this proposal. Having argued 
against the charge of essentialism, I argue that scholars should, in fact, consider these writers to 
be feminists. Finally, I address how the ideologies of these writers fit into today’s mainstream 
American feminism, finding that certain ideas transfer well while others, such as their ideas on 
transgenderism, prove more problematic for contemporary feminists. 
It is beneficial to view these writers in context within the field of linguistics, which began 
only relatively recently to concern itself with gender: particularly since the 1970s, language and 
gender has become a prominent subfield within linguistics, examining how a person’s social 
patterns shape their linguistic habits, how they are socialized to use language, other people’s 
reactions to their use of language in social settings, and other such topics related to the 
intersection of language and gender. Feminist movements in the 1970s gave certain American 
linguists the idea to focus on “women’s language” and how women were linguistically different 
from men, rather than operating under the assumption that men’s speech was “normal” speech 
and everything else was merely a deviation from this, therefore not meriting the amount of 
attention that men’s speech received.  Robin Lakoff, a well-known American linguist, wrote a 
book entitled Language and Women’s Place, published in 1975, that many people credit with 
spurring the creation of language and gender as a distinct field; she discussed “women’s 
language” in relation to white middle-class heterosexual women, who constituted the main focus 
of language and gender at its origins. Gendered language typically does not directly reference 
gender, as references to gender often intersect with references to other aspects of a person’s 
identity, such as social network, occupation, or values. Nonetheless, when Lakoff published 
Language and Women’s Place, the idea of important linguistic differences between men and 
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women seemed to capture the popular imagination (Frawley). The field also focused on 
languages and communities in which speech directly indexed the gender of the speaker; many 
linguists have pointed to Japanese as a prime example of a language that contains a distinct 
genderlect (gender-based dialect) or “women’s language” (Frawley). Lakoff emphasized the 
ways in which linguistic representation showed bias against women and other ways in which it 
demonstrated sexism, such as the use of he and man as the default for generic references to a 
non-gendered person. The author made clear that sexual difference in language brought bias 
along with it, and created a hierarchy that helped to not only demonstrate, but also continue, the 
institutional oppression of women in various areas (Frawley). In later years, research in the field 
began to de-emphasize sexual difference and focus more on diversity within genders and how 
other factors of a person’s identity could also interact with their gender in influencing their 
linguistic habits as well as how they develop their relations to other people via language use 
(Frawley).  
The sociopolitical climate of Europe after World War II set the stage for an 
unprecedented and still-controversial feminism that uniquely combined philosophical, linguistic, 
sociological, and even biological concepts, so a brief historical survey is also useful. French 
women had played a crucial role in resisting the Occupation during the war, both within and 
outside of the formal Resistance. They had filled roles for which women would not have been 
considered suitable in times of peace, given the traditional gender roles of the time, but 
exceptions to these strict gender roles were made during the war, as the Resistance wished to 
maximize its power and resources. They served not merely as aides to the Resistance, but as 
founding members, putting themselves in great danger to contribute to the collective effort 
during these difficult years in France (Douzou 9-10). Many women found ways to resist both 
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within and outside of the home during the Occupation, despite the risk of punishment, including 
arrest or deportation to a concentration camp. It might appear logical to classify the acceptance 
of new roles as a feminist act, but many women in fact cited traditionally feminine values such as 
family and domesticity as a major contributing factor in driving them to take on these new roles; 
they wished to do their part to protect their loved ones, meaning that their actual motivations for 
resisting did not necessarily clash with the collaborationist Vichy regime’s attempts to encourage 
women to focus on conservative family values. Pétain and his regime rewarded women who had 
many children, even presenting them with medals, and emphasized women’s role as the moral 
backbone of their families. The regime emphasized domesticity and stability, reversing much of 
the independence that women had recently gained. However, these efforts on the part of the 
regime backfired in practice as the women channeled these values rather differently than Pétain 
and his administration had anticipated. This suggests that, in the postwar world, overall changes 
in ideology and values progressed more slowly than did changes in women’s day-to-day 
practical roles.  
 After the war, France found itself in the difficult position of attempting to reclaim its 
status as a Great Power in Europe after the embarrassment of its quick defeat by the Germans 
and the collaboration of the Vichy regime with the Third Reich. Charles DeGaulle and his 
administration placed great emphasis on the idea of stability across the board. This included not 
only the rebuilding of systems of transportation and communication, but also the return of 
stability in people’s day-to-day lives. “Gender stability” constituted a particularly important part 
of the cultural stability that the administration wished to reconstruct (Colvin 693). In the post-
war world, French women were punished for betraying not only their country, but their 
femininity: twenty thousand women had their heads shaved as retribution for various crimes, 
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including collaboration and acting as German spies or torturers (Colvin 694). Women’s 
magazines such as Elle and other cultural sources also reiterated traditional femininity and its 
societal importance, equating French identity with the concept of the nuclear family and a 
conservative attitude towards gender relations. These cultural sources presented women as rather 
meek, domestic, devoted mothers; they presented women with specific aesthetics that they 
should aspire to and focused on the idea that women should search for a husband, with the clear 
implication that following the magazine’s aesthetic instructions would help them to achieve this 
important goal (Colvin 695-6). A woman’s aesthetic and her sexuality served as tools in her 
search for a husband, which these sources presented as her most important battle (Colvin 701). 
The woman’s happiness or desires were almost entirely absent from such conversations in these 
cultural sources. 
Emphasizing aesthetic norms and the importance of physical presentation marked a 
departure from wartime standards, which placed more value on other priorities, such as daily acts 
of resistance, than on women’s physical appearance (Colvin 697). Cultural sources did their part 
to recreate the dominant, domestic concept of normalcy in the postwar order, emphasizing 
conservative concepts of family and gender roles. Some even asserted that motherhood was the 
factor that truly brought out a woman’s beauty, though they also stated that even married women 
must pay plenty of attention to their appearance in order to prevent their husband from losing 
interest (Colvin 700-1). Such claims serve to further emphasize the connection between a return 
to traditional values and the focus on beauty adopted by many cultural sources after the war. 
Keeping women up to date on beauty and trends in this way also served as another way for 
France to assert itself as equal to its allies in every way and attempt to keep up with them as it 
struggled to regain its status as a great power as fully and as quickly as possible in the wake of 
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the war (Colvin 699). Cultural sources similarly treated fashion as a homogenizing agent and a 
way of marking one’s conformity with the French state and its values during this time period as 
well (Colvin 704). The government appeared to believe that a return to domesticity constituted 
the most efficient way to stabilize the country in order to accomplish this goal, both in order to 
provide citizens with stable day-to-day lives and in order to restore the population after the 
decimation of World War II; these values quickly became evident in many aspects of postwar 
French culture.  Many scholars, including Alison Martin, have argued that France’s complicated 
relationship with feminism has ties to the country’s history of needing to overcome the 
differences between its people in order to survive; many French people viewed feminism as a 
divisive element that created more problems and difficulties than it solved, which went against 
the country’s values (Martin 2). In many cases, the state has made a conscious effort to repress 
differences and emphasize anything that will bond all of its people together; the postwar period 
demonstrates one such period in which the government emphasized domesticity and uniformity 
in order to provide stability, valuing this over the concept of feminism or fighting for women’s 
rights.  
Though French women gained the right to vote in 1944, a mere few months before the 
Liberation and more than two decades after women had gained this right in many other Western 
countries, authors such as Hanna Diamond have argued that this change did not constitute a 
major win for feminist ideology, in fact happening “almost by accident” (Diamond 730). The 
numbers of women involved in politics, and even of women who voted, remained relatively low, 
particularly after an initial push by various parties to involve women in politics in order to gain 
the female vote; these efforts faded rather quickly (Diamond 730). Many women stated at the 
time that they concerned themselves primarily with their daily lives, not with the issues brought 
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up by male politicians; issues considered uniquely “female” rarely came before committees or 
received political attention, leading some women to conclude that they did not relate to or care 
for politics (Diamond 731). Though women had gained the right to vote, the political 
environment remained far from inclusive and, as a whole, failed to genuinely encourage 
women’s involvement in this sphere. These issues regarding women in politics demonstrate that, 
despite certain apparent markers of progress such as increased reproductive rights and university 
enrollment for women, French society in fact continued to treat women as inferior to men in 
many ways during the post-war years.  
 Many well-known poststructuralist feminist writers, such as Luce Irigaray and Hélène 
Cixous, grew up in this cultural climate, having been born in the 1930s. This postwar 
environment, which clearly demonstrated a push towards American-style domesticity, shaped 
their views, and a more feminist counterculture began to take root, strengthening as their 
generation reached adulthood, particularly in the late 1960s into the 1970s. 1968 brought a 
period of great civil unrest to France, including general strikes and the occupation of universities; 
this atmosphere of change extended to the women’s movement, and radical feminists seized the 
chance to not only call attention to problems in their society, but even publicly condemn the 
society as a whole in some cases rather than push for reforms within the existing structure, a 
strategy more commonly employed by earlier feminists (Greenwald 85). These events brought a 
great deal more attention to feminism in France and shed light on the demands of women 
fighting for equality. This increase in activism also made many French women more willing to 
openly support feminism and discuss women’s issues in explicitly political terms (Greenwald 
86). After the Events of May 1968, the feminist movement seemed to divide in two: some 
women fighting for rights decided to focus on individualism and values more similar to those of 
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contemporary feminism, including the demand that patriarchal societies re-examine and reinvent 
many of their conceptions of gender roles and social institutions in order to work towards 
women’s equality, as well as a less misogynistic society overall (Greenwald 2).  
The other sect was the branch of feminism that many outsiders came to know as “French 
feminism,” the less activist branch that, not actually considering itself “feminist” at all, found its 
inspiration in the work of poststructuralist philosophers and argued for the importance of the 
body to women’s lived experiences, as well as the idea that society should emphasize rather than 
move past the connection between the sexual body and consciousness (Greenwald 2). Well-
known figures within this branch of feminism include the aforementioned Luce Irigaray, as well 
as Hélène Cixous, a French professor, writer, and poet who established herself as an important 
figure in French poststructuralist theory with works such as her 1975 article “Le Rire de la 
Meduse” (‘The Laugh of the Medusa’). The work of “French feminist” writers such as Luce 
Irigaray and Hélène Cixous constituted a great departure from the work of other French women 
such as Simone de Beauvoir who were, in fact, self-proclaimed feminists. In fact, as Irigaray 
describes in the preface to her 1990 book Je, tu, nous (‘I, you, we’), de Beauvoir seemed to 
intentionally keep her distance from this sect of the movement, not publicly associating herself 
with Irigaray and hardly even interacting with her at all (Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 10).  
There is an extensive amount of scholarship on the concept of French feminism and the 
writers who most embody its tenets. Even the concept of what American society calls “French 
feminism” has been the subject of much debate. This terminology has come to be associated with 
a few writers in particular, Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray being the most well-known. 
Christine Delphy argues that the division of feminism into national sects based on a term like 
“French feminism” is counterproductive and unnecessary (Delphy 192). In addition, she believes 
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that attributing one specific variety of content or narrow set of attributes to a particular feminist 
movement reflects only an outsider’s point of view, implying that this perspective takes away the 
nuance and firsthand knowledge that would come from an insider’s point of view. Allowing an 
outsider to define a social movement such as this also raises questions of the power dynamic of 
observed vs. observer as well as who gets to define the movement, its goals, and its core 
attributes. Delphy also laments the fact that scholarship on “French feminism” in the United 
States focuses on language, writing, discourse, and other similar themes, rather than on the 
activism conducted by feminists in France (Delphy 191). For many Americans, this handful of 
writers “represent” French feminism in a way that oversimplifies the movement, its goals and 
accomplishments, and the larger, complex history of feminism in France. In fact, many of France 
consider the concept of “French feminism” to be a type of feminism created by Americans, 
forcibly constructing what they consider to be unnatural combinations of theories and 
amalgamations of work; many of these writers and works are not, on an individual level, as 
highly regarded in France as they are in the United States (Roussos 1). Delphy cautions that 
French feminism should be defined as “an ideological and political trend in the countries where 
it exists as an object of debate,” and as something that exists in works that expand on French or 
other material; it should not, she warns, be defined simply as the entire body of work of any 
author who has been attached to this French feminist label, as these authors are “referents” of 
French feminism rather than the embodiment of it, and furthermore, there is disagreement over 
which authors should be included in such a list, which would create discrepancies regardless 
(Delphy 196-7). 
Roussous points out that the path of feminism in the two countries has been, and remains, 
rather different. She acknowledges that feminism has deeper, more long-standing roots in France 
	 13 
than in the United States and that the country has seen more progress in certain areas, such as 
reproductive rights, than the United States has; on other hand, she finds that feminism has, in 
some ways, had a rather difficult history in France in general, stating that issues such as sexual 
harassment are still regarded very differently in France than they are in the United States to this 
day. Furthermore, she believes that the country owes many important moments in its history to 
uniting diverse peoples rather than dividing them, and has found that some in the country feel 
that feminism is counterproductive to these aims (Roussous 2). Many who are of this opinion 
wish to place emphasis on the national identity rather than the identity of a particular gender; 
these are merely a few of the obstacles to the feminist movement in France on a broader level. 
Roussos also acknowledges another misleading aspect of the American view of “French 
feminism”: much of the work of those feminists that are in fact popular in France, such as 
Simone de Beauvoir, also contradict the work of those writers whom Americans now most 
commonly know as “French feminists.”  
The 1990s saw a certain amount of backlash against the concept of French feminism. A 
good deal of discussion was devoted to how “French feminism” differed from “feminism in 
France,” how the idea of French feminism had been constructed outside of France, and to the use 
of “biological essentialism” by writers such as Luce Irigaray and Helène Cixous. For instance, in 
1996, Christine Delphy wrote an article entitled “L’Invention du “French Feminism: Une 
Démarche Essentielle” (‘The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move’), in which she 
is extremely critical of the movement Americans know as French Feminism. She questions the 
very need for such a term, pointing out that no other country refers to their feminist movement 
by referencing its national identity, and this seems to place unnecessary, specific boundaries on 
the movement (Delphy 190). Delphy takes issue with the construction of the idea of “French 
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feminism” because she believes it is simply an artificial reaction that only seems to have 
meaning from an outsider’s point of view, which calls into question its usefulness as well as the 
power dynamic between the actual individuals who supposedly belong to this movement and 
those who are referring to or writing on the topic (Delphy 191). She does not believe that the 
writers considered extremely significant to the movement known as “French Feminism” are in 
fact held in high esteem by feminists within France. Instead, she believes that Americans simply 
attached this label to the ideas espoused by these writers in order to add prestige and credibility 
to the amalgamation of ideas, and to the claim that these ideas were feminist ones; in fact, she 
attaches the label of imperialism to these actions. Delphy uses this classification in criticizing the 
way Americans, decidedly an outsider group in this case, have taken it upon themselves to 
construct this concept of “French feminism” and declare non-feminists the head of the 
movement, an action they would never replicate in presenting or analyzing their own domestic 
feminist movement (Delphy 192-3).  
Delphy even argues that the only works truly attributable to French feminism are Anglo-
American works about “French feminism,” a term that she states is otherwise difficult to define; 
in the end, she defines it by using the term only to refer to Anglo-American authors who have 
written about the concept of French feminism (Delphy 197). This author does not find that 
French feminism properly addresses feminist questions, believing that the movement focuses too 
much on difference, an approach she refers to as outdated (Delphy 194). She takes issue with the 
conflation of “the feminine” and “women,” as well as “the masculine” and “men,” as well as the 
way in which the well-known French feminist authors use these concepts to discuss how actual 
men and women act and what they are like. Furthermore, she objects to the implication in French 
feminist works that the concepts of masculine and feminine are significant or function as an 
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immutable, essential division regardless of culture; she finds that this conflates perception with 
reality, and the current societal perception of “two genders” does not mean that this is what truly 
exists. Similarly, the idea that sexual difference is the only difference between humans that 
matters, or is the driving force behind sexual attraction as well as a useful basis for social, 
psychological, cultural, and social division, also comes into question (Delphy 198). The 
contemporary political and analytical goals of feminism, she argues, are highly incompatible 
with such lines of thinking, which treat the concepts of masculine and feminine as having an 
“essence” that always exists, rather than as constructions of the societies that use such terms. 
Claire Goldberg Moses agrees with Delphy on several points in her 1996 article “La 
Construction du ‘French Feminism’ dans le Discours Universitaire Américain” (‘Made in 
America: “French Feminism” in academia’). In this piece, she begins by putting the movement in 
context, discussing the many groups of feminist writers that formed during the 1970s and 1980s, 
including Psychoanalyse et politique (“Psych et po”), a group which Hélène Cixous was highly 
associated with, as was Irigiray, until she had a “violent rupture” with the other members of the 
group in late 1974, likely due to infighting over ideologies (Moses 245). As time went on, a 
division was evident between the feminists in Psych et po and the rest of the feminist movement 
in France; Moses describes the group receiving much of the blame for anything that went wrong 
in the movement in France and in fact developing a reputation for being a “religious cult” that 
cut its members off from the rest of their societal commitments and obligations (Moses 248-9). 
Moses also describes the way that the group Psych et po, which included many of today’s well-
known “French feminist” writers such as Cixous and Irigaray, not only distanced itself from the 
activism of the time that concerned itself with these issues, but in fact distanced itself from the 
actual feminist movement, as it considered feminists to be too masculine and simply attempting 
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to share in the power that men had rather than dismantling it (Moses 249). The author presents 
the case for Psych et po having disrupted the movement through actions such as trademarking 
the phrase mouvement libération des femmes (MLF) and suing other feminists in court, though 
this sect of French feminism ended up receiving the support of many American academics and 
constituting the core of what Americans now know as “French feminism”; the author believes 
this to be a mistake (Moses 251).  
Most of the literature written in more recent years takes a nuanced view of Cixous, 
Irigaray, their “French feminism,” and their discussion of the body. Manashi Bora’s PhD thesis 
Ideas of language in French Feminism with Special Reference to Luce Irigaray, completed at 
Gauhati University in 2008, provides context for the work of these writers and the movement 
they became an integral part of, delving into the history of women’s movements in France, 
which can be traced back to the French Revolution, and how the poststructuralist philosophers of 
the time influenced this particular subset of well-known feminists in France. In a broader sense, 
the women’s liberation movement in France during the 1970s was in fact shifting away from a 
narrower focus on legal rights and women’s role in the public sphere, to analyzing various 
influential social structures they found to be created by and centered around men, such as family, 
government, history, etc.; the movement also shifted towards analyzing various forms of 
knowledge, including language, the key communication system that allowed the various other 
social structures to function (Bora 3). As the author argues, the concept of language constructing 
as well as reflecting one’s reality and the subjectivities of the world was one that was growing 
substantially more popular in the philosophy of the 1970s (Bora 8).  
Bora thus places the writing of these poststructuralist feminists into its historical and 
philosophical context and describes how the writers who came to be known as “French 
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feminists”- and particularly Irigaray- approached the issue, as one of bringing women into these 
traditionally masculine fields by allowing them to write themselves, their experiences, and their 
bodies into their work. They combined activism with a focus on language to call attention to the 
role of language in their oppression. By extension, such an effort also called attention to the role 
of the men who had created it and continued to use the language to uphold the traditional power 
structures by shutting women out of domains such as discourse, as well as by using language 
whose subjectivities were turned against the feminine; Irigaray, for instance, did a great number 
of empirical studies on gender bias in the French language (Bora 19). The author also discusses 
the alternate form of writing invented by these writers- typically referred to as écriture feminine 
or parler femme- and the ways that the French feminists who were attempting to create and 
popularize it wished it to reflect women’s experiences and women’s bodies in particular. Cixous 
and Irigaray acted as two of the most significant and well-known proponents of this “new 
language,” which is not only outlined but also embodied by their own work. They wanted 
language to be fluid, lyrical, and not tied to particular meaning, as they felt this better reflected 
femininity; they found that a woman’s experiences were extremely closely tied to her body, 
which, as Bora points out, has led to much criticism of their “essentialist” and “utopian” views 
(Bora 27). Bora does not, however, necessarily agree with these claims. She takes into account 
many recent interpretations of Irigaray’s writing in particular and focuses on those that more 
sympathetically view her biologically-based arguments as simply an attempt to differentiate men 
from women and ensure that women’s experiences would receive attention at a time when men 
and their experiences were considered the default standard against which all others should be 
measured. While making using of Bora’s ideas on linguistic feminism and the work of Luce 
Irigaray, I focused my research more on the extent and utility of French feminists’ use of the 
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theme of essentialism, as well as the usefulness of such strategies in today’s feminism, than on 
the invention of women’s language or particulars of Irigaray’s use of her language in her own 
work which received the majority of Bora’s attention.  
My own research on the role of language in the work of French feminists required 
balancing the various, often highly contradictory viewpoints belonging to various scholars across 
time periods in regards to what exactly constitutes “French feminism” and whether this term 
proves useful at all. Personally, I find that it does, as scholars have now used French feminism as 
a classification for decades, with the result that it now clearly denotes a particular group of 
writers and brand of feminism, though I agree that the term itself constitutes an Anglo-American 
construct. One could even classify it as a misnomer, as the grouping together of this particular 
group of writers and ideas occurred not necessarily naturally, and not via any efforts of the 
writers themselves, but largely at the hands of Anglo-American academics; of course, French 
feminism also does not represent the extent, or even majority, of feminist thought in France in 
the late twentieth century. Acknowledging these issues and keeping them in mind as I use the 
term in my own work, I have nevertheless found it beneficial to use the French feminist 
classification, given the history of the term’s usage in academia and even in non-academic 
circles today. The prevalence of the term’s current uses in various sectors of American society 
make it highly useful in examining a particular branch of feminism. Certain scholars have 
questioned the authenticity of this grouping, and by extension, the need for the very concept of 
French feminism. I argue that, regardless of French feminism’s less-than-French origins or 
somewhat artificial beginnings, it now constitutes a movement that unquestionably merits 
examination, as it has proven highly significant in feminist thought for several decades now. In 
addition, I agree with critic Katherine Costello’s argument that, given the variety of feminist 
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work by French writers translated into English and published in the US, the grouping of and 
emphasis on this particular group of people reflects, rather than an actual ignorance of other 
writers or ideologies present in France’s feminist circles at the time, simply a particular interest 
in the psychoanalytic approach of these specific writers (Costello 18). Though it is important to 
keep in mind the questions about authenticity and terminology posed by various scholars, 
including those above, the role that French feminism has played in feminist thought and 
academia since its inception makes it an important movement to examine nonetheless. 
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Chapter 1 
Philosophical Background & the Shaping of French Feminist Arguments  
The philosophical background of French feminist arguments can shed light on why these 
discussions took the form that they did. Many scholars, including those already mentioned, have 
questioned why French feminist writers grounded their ideology in essentialism. Historical, 
social, and philosophical context is a crucial tool in answering such questions, shedding light on 
the strategies and arguments employed by the group known as “the French feminists.” 
Philosophy plays an important role in French society in general; the French feminists would have 
received an education in philosophy even as schoolchildren, gaining familiarity with 
philosophical arguments and rhetoric, and along with the field of linguistics, the field of 
philosophy strongly influences the work of many in this group. Irigaray remains rather private 
about her own early life and education due to her belief that the patriarchal academic 
establishment could use personal details against her. However, as previously mentioned, it is 
known that she received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Paris VIII, with her 
famous work Speculum de l’autre femme being her second doctoral thesis. Other French feminist 
writers, such as Cixous, also had a great deal of exposure to philosophy: Cixous, like Irigaray, 
had worked closely with Lacan, and also knew eminent philosopher Jacques Derrida, whose 
philosophy served as a principal guiding force for French feminist ideas.  
Many French feminists, including Irigaray, did consider themselves primarily 
philosophers, prioritizing this label over any other classification (Bora 34). The French feminists’ 
emphasis on the philosophical aspects of their work indicates that further investigation into the 
philosophical background of the movement will provide clarity as to the origins of the French 
feminists’ own arguments. Philosophical context and the intellectual environment in France 
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during this period shaped French feminist arguments. This occurred via the influence of pre-
existing ideas the movement gladly adopted, such as the conception of language as a construct 
that proved fundamental to their discussions, but also through the role played by ideas these 
writers specifically sought to refute in crafting their own arguments, including certain Freudian 
theories of essentialism. 
When attempting to account for the significant role of poststructuralist philosophers on 
this movement, one might question how the French feminists managed to employ 
poststructuralism to promote their sexual difference-focused conception of gender, given that 
poststructuralism deemphasized binaries and focused on constructionism, while French feminist 
arguments do focus on the body and the importance of emphasizing, rather than downplaying, 
“natural” difference. Though this contrast might appear troubling at first glance, these 
movements do not, in fact, inherently oppose each other. The French feminists focused on 
language precisely because they agreed with philosophers like Ferdinand Saussure in regards to 
the concept of language as a method of producing self, identity, and meaning (Khoja-Moolji). 
They believed in the power of language in culture, as their philosophy held that ideas could not 
exist without language. For the French feminists, this meant that language “created” ideas in a 
way that made language highly significant, for if the language that one uses to create ideas 
contains inherent bias, then it will become nearly impossible for the ideas not to carry this same 
bias. It is the desire to eliminate this bias that led them to their examination of language as such a 
crucial cultural tool, and even to invent écriture feminine with the intention that this entirely new 
manner of speaking would liberate women from the need to use a language inherently prejudiced 
against them. Thus, the idea of linguistic constructionism does align with the work of the French 
feminists, as this constructionism led them to the conclusion that language not only reflected, but 
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helped create, the misogyny they found in their society; this also led them to the more hopeful 
conclusion that, by changing how people used and thought about language, they could also 
change their reality. 
Simone de Beauvoir adapted Jean Paul Sartre’s theories of existentialism when writing 
about women to explain how men constituted the subject and women constituted the “other” in 
the society, an idea that proved highly salient and is used in the later works of many French 
feminists as a framework for analyzing women’s position in Western society (Bora 36). The 
study of semiology furthered French feminists’ discussion of the concept of otherness; the 
French philosopher Roland Barthes placed great emphasis on semiology, analyzing what people 
in a society take for granted or believe to be simple, common, unquestioned truths, in order to 
uncover the underlying ideologies that lead to such beliefs. This approach also demonstrates how 
poststructuralism and constructionism do in fact agree with the work of the French feminists: 
semiotic examinations sought to bring people’s attention to the fact that historical, social, and 
linguistic context shape meaning, in opposition to the idea of meaning as inherent and 
unquestionable. A semiotic examination constitutes an effort to discover or create a better 
understanding of the true historical explanation for certain things that the society might typically 
view as simply “natural.” This analysis of “what goes without saying” logically appealed to 
writers studying the condition of women, as it provided them a framework for examining societal 
assumptions of what women “naturally” are or should be, allowing them to analyze and draw 
attention to the actual historical, values-based, less “natural” reasons for such assumptions (Bora 
38). In the case of the French feminists, the most crucial overarching societal assumption in 
question during such a semiotic examination was typically the supposed natural inferiority of 
women.  
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 Derridean philosophy, with its emphasis on language and differentiation, also played a 
crucial role in the philosophical climate that shaped the work of French poststructuralist feminist 
writers. According to Jacques Derrida, language shapes meaning, and neither language nor its 
referents can have meaning without each other. This leads to his conclusion that fixed identities 
and meanings do not exist; there is nothing “beyond” linguistic processing, meaning that nothing 
can entirely avoid the influence of language, a subjective tool (Bora 40). This particular 
Derridean idea proves critical to many theories of French feminism, including the idea that 
women’s sexuality is discursive, meaning that the liberation of women’s sexuality would require 
changes to language itself (Berg 55). Derrida and many of those following in his footsteps often 
used these ideas about the crucial role of language to draw attention to identities and concepts 
that were typically repressed or marginalized. Along with Michel Foucault, Derrida placed a 
great deal of emphasis on the idea of otherness and “the remainder”- essentially, they discussed 
ways in which society excluded anyone who did not fit into the category of a heterosexual white 
Western man. Derridean thought constituted a reaction and opposition to the idea of a self-
centered and self-sufficient Cartesian subject insistent upon seeing “the world in its own self-
image” (Bora 43). This emphasis on otherness, which included women, made Derridean 
“deconstruction” a highly useful tool and commonly-used line of thinking among the French 
poststructuralist feminist writers. 
Several other anti-humanist French philosophers also had a great deal of influence on the 
work of writers who rose to prominence within this more essentialist sect of feminism. French 
philosophers such as Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and Louis Althusser focused on those 
who did not fit into the categories most valued by the patriarchal and logocentric attitudes of 
Western society (Bora 37). This drew the attention of many poststructuralist French female 
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writers, and they often used similar thinking in their writing on women’s issues. Many French 
philosophers at the time, such as Louis Althusser, also focused on Marxism and antihumanism, 
arguing that the state used repressive and ideological apparatuses to keep people docile, allowing 
the dominant social system to remain unquestioned and powerful. Foucault even argued that 
truth does not exist outside of regimes and the system of power, as power belongs to those who 
determine the norms of a society and find themselves in a position to regulate and enforce these 
norms on a daily basis; those whose regime controls the productive power of a society are those 
who will hold this highly important position of “creating” truth (Bora 38). Such arguments 
strongly influenced the poststructuralist French feminist writers by furthering the discussion on 
who determines what it means to be a woman, how a patriarchal society constructs the concept 
of femininity, and how the dominant power systems had influenced women’s lives for many 
centuries. 
Another French philosopher, Maurice Merleau Ponty, played an important role in 
encouraging the essentialism for which French feminism has long been derided: he emphasized 
embodied experience and how the body shaped relationships between the self, others, and the 
world as a whole (Bora 42). He characterizes the body as “the subject of perception” and argues 
that perception does not occur objectively, because it occurs through the medium of the body. As 
the body plays such a crucial role in a person’s presence in the world, Ponty states that it must 
constitute part of one’s “natural self.” In fact, in his work, the philosopher makes unequivocal 
references to “the fact that we are our body” (Merleau-Ponty 206). It follows that, subscribing to 
these theories, the French feminists would not desire to remove the body from their discussion of 
societal issues, particularly issues related to sexual difference. Believing the body forms an 
important part of a person’s interactions with the world, and also believing that sexual difference 
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constituted the distinguishing factor between men and women, many French feminists did not 
find it possible to discuss societal misogyny, as well as potential solutions to the problems it 
caused, without frequent reference to the body.  
The French feminists’ emphasis on the body may also have resulted partly from their 
engagement with Freudian ideas. Freud focused many of his explanations for social psychology 
on the body, including by describing it as a site of memory that stores aspects of human history 
and connects people to those before them. The philosopher also focuses on “the relationship 
between an individual and the object of interpretation,” discussing the body as a place where 
power and discourse interact (Punday 517). Evident connections exist between such ideas and 
the work of many later French philosophers, such as Foucault, even as the ways that they use 
these theories and concepts lead them to conclusions that contrast sharply with those of Freud 
himself. For instance, Foucault uses Freud as a resource and catalyst for the discussion of 
analyzing individuals according to spatial laws. However, Freud’s main function in Foucault’s 
work remains as a foil, as most of Foucault’s conception of power and sexuality does not align 
with that of Freud (Punday 517). By influencing Foucault and other philosophers, Freud by 
extension influences the ideas of certain French feminists; of course, the French feminists also 
concentrated on the body in their own arguments, but did so in a way that, on the whole, 
contradicts and negates the theories of Freud. Like Foucault, an important influence on this 
movement, the French feminists most often find use for Freudian ideas only as a foil to their own 
arguments. Many of this group objected to the extent of Freud’s biological determinism, and in 
particular, his definition of women as those without a penis, or women as lack (Bora 48). While 
essentialism holds that different categories of people have intrinsically different characteristics 
that make them who they naturally, inherently are, determinism like that espoused by Freud takes 
	 26 
this argument another step further, positing that these characteristics constitute determining 
factors that decide many aspects of a person’s life or “destiny,” allowing very little room for free 
will or individualism. These ideas constituted simply another way of prioritizing the male 
experience as well as defining women as “different” and inferior in an immutable, natural way 
that would immensely impact the possibilities of their lives, but could never change due to any 
action of theirs; thus, certain French feminists reclaimed the discussion of the body to instead 
emphasize and celebrate female difference.  
The work of the French feminists demonstrates their reactions to other philosophical and 
social ideas of the time, both in the ways that they incorporate the ideas of those they agree with 
and in the way they construct their arguments as rebuttals to those whose ideas they aim to 
refute. The historical, political, and philosophical context surrounding their discussions of the 
body plays a crucial role, as these feminists constructed their arguments in what they felt was the 
best way to combat the particular misogynistic arguments and conditions they encountered. In 
her book Éthique de la différence sexuelle (‘Thinking the Difference’), Irigaray presents her 
scathing opinion of the concept of the “neutral individual,” stating that she finds this concept 
wholly unrealistic and saying, “women get pregnant, not men; women and little girls are raped, 
boys very rarely; the bodies of women and girls are used for involuntary prostitution and 
pornography, those of men infinitely less; and so on” (Irigaray, Thinking the Difference 59). She 
even argues that women’s ability to create another human being accounts for the fact that they 
are more responsive to others and speak about people other than themselves more than their male 
counterparts do (Bora 120-121). Such sentiments, treating the body as the central issue, make it 
clear that Irigaray’s concern was entirely focused on presenting the female experience as distinct 
from the male experience, yet never less valuable (Bora 44). She in fact goes so far as to argue in 
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her book Je, tu, nous that, “To wish to get rid of sexual difference is to call for a genocide more 
radical than any form of destruction there has ever been in History” (Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 12). 
Irigaray demonstrates very clearly that her definition of femininity centers on the biologically 
female body and all the ways it differs from the biologically male body, seemingly in an attempt 
to differentiate women from men as much as possible and create a concept of a distinctly 
feminine identity; men and their experiences, language use, etc., were considered the default, and 
Irigaray attempted to counteract this by placing the emphasis of her analysis on what she 
considered the most immutable, core ways that women did differ from men, believing in some 
crucial, essentially “feminine” part of women that could not be altered or taken away regardless 
of the ways in which the patriarchy devalued them. Toril Moi describes Irigaray’s strategy by 
arguing that, “it still remains politically essential for feminists to define women as women in 
order to counteract the patriarchal oppression that defines women as women” (Whitford, Luce 
Irigaray 102). It appears that Irigaray does exactly this as she continues to insist upon sexual 
difference. 
Irigaray’s discussion of women’s “two lips” has also attracted a great deal of attention, 
and many have interpreted this as a highly literal discussion of women’s genitalia, adding to the 
criticism surrounding Irigaray’s use of biology to discuss women in her work. However, many 
critics, including Margaret Whitford, have argued that Irigaray did not necessarily intend the 
“two lips” as a definition of women on literal biological terms. Whitford also objects to the 
characterization of the “two lips” as merely a specific symbol for the the idea of “feminine 
plurality,” a common poststructuralist idea that Irigaray engages with often as she describes the 
distinction between men and women’s sexuality by focusing on women’s multiple sexual organs. 
Despite Irigaray’s other uses of this concept, Whitford argues that Irigaray did not mean for the 
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“two lips” to specifically symbolize plurality, nor was she alluding only to a literal anatomical 
identity of a woman; instead, the lips themselves have a multiplicity of meaning that reflects this 
concept of feminine plurality, and goes beyond the intentions of one particular author (in this 
case, Irigaray) to evoke, and become part of, “our cultural and symbolic ‘baggage’” (Whitford, 
Irigaray’s Body Symbolic 99). Jane Gallop and Elizabeth Grosz argue that this symbol has an 
inter-discursive rather than specifically referential function, meaning that this symbol reflects 
multiple discourses coexisting and perhaps combatting each other. They find that this reflects the 
discourse that Irigaray herself creates with her own work, as she intends it to exist alongside and 
combat other, misogynistic discourses created by the patriarchy, which she saw currently 
prevailing in her society. Thus, much like the idea of emphasizing sexual difference to carve out 
a particular identity and place in society for women, the idea of the “two lips” appears as a direct 
reaction to dominant ideologies or discourses of the time. Irigaray uses biology as the tool she 
believes will most efficiently and directly confront the way that patriarchal societies, such as the 
one she herself lives in, identify and oppress women.  
Certain scholars have also pointed out that Irigaray’s more specific discussions of 
anatomy can in fact negate rather than support the ideology of essentialism. Despite the fact that 
her anatomical discussions initially strike many readers as presupposing an overly biological 
definition of gender, this interpretation should not go unquestioned: the true effect of her 
references to biology merits further attention. The poststructuralist intellectual environment and 
ideology of Derridean deconstruction underpinning French feminist work does not begin and end 
with language: in French feminist ideology, societal conceptions of the body are, similarly to 
language, constructed and shaped by the dominant discourses of society. As such, they are 
neither objective nor unmediated. In the words of Jacques Derrida, “There is no ‘the’ body” 
	 29 
(Derrida 2005, 288-289). By this, the philosopher means that ideas of the body, like everything 
else, should be questioned and examined for assumptions whose explanations lie in historical and 
societal context, rather than in “nature.” If the body itself is not considered a static, unbiased and 
universal fact of life, but rather another product of society created along the same lines as 
language, then biology does not appear sufficient as an approach to defining “woman” or the 
concept of gender, but instead would merit further definition and discussion in itself; it follows 
that Irigaray did not in fact intend to use biology to define the experience of women. Though it 
might at first glance seem tempting to pinpoint these biological references as examples of 
essentialism, the ideology of the French feminist movement holds that language mediates the 
body, and not vice versa.  
This tenet of the movement’s ideology does not have to conflict with Irigaray’s 
anatomical discussions: when viewed in light of this constructionist ideological background, 
Irigaray’s biological references could lead readers not towards a biological definition of gender, 
but instead towards questioning the very idea of anatomical referentiality (Costello 48). 
According to this constructionist ideology, language is not simply referential, meaning that 
language can never perfectly or literally represent a referent. Differences exist between language 
and its intended referent, and these differences result in the movement’s belief that nothing, 
including the body, can be considered unbiased or untouched by language. For instance, Jane 
Gallop argues that, when Irigaray discusses her idea of male sex, she discusses not literal male 
genital anatomy, but rather “an already phallomorphic conception of male genitals, that actually 
has only a selective relation to male anatomy”; readers should read her discussion of female sex 
in a similarly inexact or somewhat metaphorical manner, rather than as an agreement with 
Freud’s statement that “anatomy is destiny” (Costello 48). Rather than directly relating biology 
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with predetermined characteristics, Irigaray simply employs this discussion of the female sex to 
redirect the conversation away from focusing only on men and their experiences, sexual and 
otherwise, while either ignoring those of women or treating them as deviations. Additionally, 
readers should likely avoid reading her discussion of female sex too literally: much like her 
discussion of male sex, it seems that this portion of Irigaray’s work does not actually constitute 
an attempt to directly discuss genitalia, but instead to invoke a general societal conception 
thereof. By nature, this societal conception of the female sex has a less-than-exact correlation to 
the female sex itself, and by invoking the concept rather than the female sex itself, Irigaray 
leaves more room for interpretation, alteration, or perhaps even criticism of this societal 
conception. This less literal interpretation leads one to the conclusion that Irigaray’s “two lips” 
and other anatomical discussions do not reduce sex to anatomy, but instead simply make 
symbolic use of biological references in order to begin a new variety of discussion about the 
body. 
Historical as well as philosophical factors shaped the biologically-based arguments of 
French feminist writers. At the time, concerns related to women’s bodies had in fact attracted the 
concern and attention of many groups centered around women’s liberation. Many began to argue 
that women could not liberate themselves without, at minimum, some progress towards giving 
women the ability decide if or when they had children; this was a new and forward-thinking 
argument for the time as it contradicted popular belief about the importance of motherhood as a 
source of women’s personal and societal value (Greenwald 63). To achieve this goal of more 
reproductive independence, women in France began to fight for more access to birth control and 
legal abortions, an issue that soon became a focal point of the mainstream mouvement libération 
des femmes. As one might expect, this new stance taken by many women’s organizations led to a 
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great deal of backlash from those concerned about falling birth rates, known as dénatalité. This 
argument held some weight in France, as the country had had concerns about its birth rates for 
many years; attempts to combat this included the Law of 13 July 1920, which made any anti-
natalist agenda illegal in addition to criminalizing abortion, and the Law of 27 March 1923, 
which established that anyone helping- or attempting to help- a women acquire an abortion could 
receive up to five years in prison as punishment. In 1939, shortly before World War II, the Code 
de la Famille made abortion penalties stricter, with prosecutions falling disproportionately on 
poor women, and by 1942, abortion was classified as a crime against society, falling into the 
category of sabotage or treason (Greenwald 64).  
These efforts did not stop after World War II. As mentioned earlier, the French 
government continued actively striving to encourage women to have more children and 
emphasizing the importance of motherhood, largely due to the same concern over birth rates that 
underpinned anti-abortion arguments from many sectors, as well as a desire to create a general 
sense of stability. They did have some success, as a general renewal in domesticity took place 
after the war, but it is likely that the focus of women’s liberation movements on abortion and 
reproductive rights in the 1970s began as a reaction to such restrictive measures and the 
dominant political discourse of domesticity. Certainly Irigaray and other French feminists would 
not have agreed with all of the arguments made in this area by the mainstream movement; in 
fact, French feminism has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on motherhood, and as 
Irigaray made clear that women should remain equal to but entirely different from men, it seems 
unlikely that she would agree with mainstream feminists’ argument that women should strive to 
embody the same individualism as men. However, the idea that women should have control of 
themselves, and particularly of their bodies, clearly underlies much of French feminist ideology; 
	 32 
responding to their patriarchal society’s attempts to control women’s bodies most likely 
constituted another reason that French feminists felt the need to focus on the body in their 
discussions. Addressing the body in their own work allowed them to present their own ideas of 
their bodies, taking the privilege of defining women’s bodies away from the patriarchy and back 
into women’s own hands. Their work emphasizes the body as something that the patriarchy 
cannot take away from women, which reverses the dialogue of oppressors attempting to assert 
their control in this area. Irigaray did not appreciate the reduction of women to their role as 
mothers, as this constructed women as, once again, simply an object, primarily used for 
producing the male subject (Weinbaum).  
Acknowledging the influence of many anti-humanist French philosophers and the context 
of dominant patriarchal discourses during this period can lead scholars to a better understanding 
of the origins of French feminist ideology and why their discussions of women and power in 
society took the form that they did. They found themselves in the position of needing to “define 
women as women” in order to reclaim this definition from, and refute concepts of “women as 
women” created by, patriarchal institutions. However, in doing so, they also needed to avoid the 
patriarchal framework and the typical pitfalls that come along with attempting such a definition 
(Whitford, Luce Irigaray 102). These include a lack of historical or social context in favor of 
assuming some unchanging “natural” quality that defines women, a common problem as writers 
strive to create a definition general enough to serve the purpose at hand. Avoiding such issues 
proves no small feat, but many French feminists found that concentrating on the discussion of 
sexual difference in particular allowed them to strike this rather delicate balance. A Deriddean 
philosophy of the body- or lack thereof, given Deridda’s argument that “there is no ‘the’ body”- 
shaped French feminists’ own anatomical discussions, along with the theories of Ponty; though 
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this group of writers agreed with Derrida’s characterization of the body as a construction, their 
work also shows agreement with Ponty’s idea that it remains a highly important part of how one 
communicates with the world, helping to form an individual’s understanding of themselves and 
others. When analyzing the particular arguments that characterize the movement, including those 
that have attracted a great deal of criticism or even discounting of the movement’s ideologies, it 
is important to view these arguments in historical, social, and philosophical context. This not 
only provides a better overall view of the movement, what it stands for, and how it fits into the 
history of feminism as a whole, but also avoids potentially inaccurate readings or interpretations 
of the work produced by these writers. In the specific case of French feminist writers’ use of 
anatomical references, a closer contextual reading can provide meaning that transcends the 
accusations of essentialism or initial inclination for scholars to read these references literally, 
leading readers instead to an analysis that better highlights the unique aspects of the movement 
that initially attracted the attention of Anglo-American academics; this also allows attention to 
focus on those aspects of French feminist ideology that could still prove useful in feminist 
discussions today. 
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Chapter 2  
Linguistic Bias & The Body: Examining the “Essentials” of Écriture Feminine 
French feminism has attracted certain harsh critiques over the years, particularly in 
regards to its focus on biology and the fact that it belongs to a sect of feminism that is often not 
highly-regarded within France itself. For instance, in her 1996 article, Claire Goldberg Moses, an 
outspoken critic of the traditional conception of French feminism, describes issues that 
constituted crucial rallying points for feminist activists at the time, such as abortion rights and 
rape, and the way that they talked about these in the broader context of questioning the 
patriarchy, marriage, housework, compulsory heterosexuality, and particularly motherhood 
(Moses 244). This clashes with much of the work of those who would come to be known as “the 
French feminists,” as they often valorized and emphasized motherhood, which they characterized 
as a uniquely feminine experience and one of those that society had devalued for centuries; this 
was particularly a feature of the writing of Luce Irigaray, and a feature that critics have heavily 
debated. As described above, many of those who Americans now know as “French feminists” 
belonged to the group Psych et po, which distanced itself from feminism as much as possible; in 
fact, many view the group as a major obstacle that the feminist movement in France has had to 
overcome over the last several decades, given its trademarking of logos and names in order to 
block other feminist movements, its ensuing lawsuit, and its sometimes inflammatory statements 
against feminism. The organization once said in a statement, “‘Feminism is radical only as the 
root of Patriarchy’” (Moses 250). By this, they may have meant that feminism encouraged 
women to simply take over the role of men in the current structure and become more like them 
rather than overturning the structure entirely, as many in the organization wished to do.  
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In spite of such sentiments from the group, which only increased in fervor over the years, 
the public continued to laud Psych et po’s publications as feminist due to the way they advocated 
for women (Moses 250). Moses argues that the American public has conflated this group, its 
writers and their work with “French feminism” because of articles published in Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society. Articles by Carolyn Burke and Elaine Marks in the summer of 
1978 juxtaposed discussion of these writers with discussion of the mouvement libération des 
femmes (MLF), and focused on the linguistic side of feminism, which was often associated with 
Cixous and Irigaray (Moses 253). This appears to have led many American to make the 
association between the mouvement libération des femmes and these writers, one which most in 
France had not made, and which some of the “French feminist” writers in question had in fact 
actively and publicly resisted. Thus, while strongly resisting the mouvement libération des 
femmes on many levels, the group known as Psych et Po, as well as many of its core, most vocal 
members, managed to become a symbol of the movement in certain circles, particularly 
American academic circles. In spite of this conflation of the movement and these individuals, 
many feminists in France did not, in fact, wish to be associated with certain attributes of the 
“French feminist” movement, such as its distance from the actual mainstream feminist 
movement and its focus on biology. However, I will argue that the French feminists were indeed 
feminists, and that their anatomical references can hold meaning outside of essentialist 
interpretations. 
One shared goal among the group known as “French feminists” was to increase the 
attention focused on, and valorization of, the female experience. They object to the reduction of 
women to the status of “not-men.” However, they do not believe that women must prove 
themselves “like men” in order to fix this problem; some question women’s meaning or motives 
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in arguing for “equality,” disagreeing with the idea that women should wish to be “similar” to 
those who currently filled the role of the oppressor in their society. Instead, many French 
feminists wish to transform the category of “not-men” into the category of “women”- a category 
that, while not less valuable, would remain, in no uncertain terms, distinct from men. This 
approach demanded the question of what, exactly, constituted a “woman”; the French feminists 
had to determine the qualities around which they could center this identity. Many of them 
responded to this dilemma by turning to essentialism and emphasizing biological differences 
between men and women, effectively removing any distinction between sex and gender, an 
approach for which they have faced heavy criticism in the years since. For many French 
feminists, womanhood centers on the body, and many of what they consider essential feminine 
qualities stem from the body’s contributions to women’s experiences. 
Within the movement known as French feminism, many authors, including Luce Irigaray 
and Hélène Cixous, placed particular emphasis on language and its role in patriarchal power 
systems. Many have referred to their ideas as “linguistic feminism”: they pointed out ties 
between the patriarchy and the language used to uphold it. They believed that the first step to 
changing their reality, and the misogyny they found within it, was to change the language that 
was used to create, express, and sustain this reality. Some writers, such as Gayatri Spivak, have 
even accused these writers of being so focused on language, discourse, and representation that 
they lose sight of actual activism in forgetting to worry about the material issues facing women 
in the real world on a day-to-day basis (Bora 6). Irigaray and Cixous believed that the creation of 
an entirely new language, which they typically referred to as écriture feminine (‘feminine 
writing’) or parler femme (‘woman speak’), would be the best way to break out of the patriarchal 
framework of traditional styles of language, which they found to be contaminated by the 
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misogyny of traditional patriarchal power structures (Bora 22). Irigaray argued that the 
patriarchal system of language allowed men to assert their dominance over women and claim 
their position as the ones to determine culture (Irigaray, I love to you 69). Irigaray also discusses 
this topic in her book j’aime à toi (‘I love to you’), arguing that men asserting their role as the 
creators of culture forget that women must create life, and society should therefore consider them 
the true creators rather than men (Irigaray, I love to you 66). Russian philosopher Mikhael 
Bakhtin had great influence on many within the French feminist movement, and once said, “We 
are taking language not as a system of abstract grammatical categories, but language conceived 
as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a 
maximum of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideological life” (Bakhtin 1981, 667). Many 
French feminists agreed with his assessment of the sociopolitical and ideological importance of 
language, both as a reflection and a tool; it soon became one of the central concerns of the 
movement. 
Much of Irigaray’s work focuses on mitigating the problems that stem from women 
having to fight against their patriarchal system of language simply to express themselves. She 
and other French writers who formed part of the “French feminism” movement devoted their 
attention to how language constructed and upheld the patriarchy. They found not only that 
conventional language had long been the language used by men and the society that oppressed 
them, but in particular that it encoded many misogynistic biases. Of course, given that this was 
the main system of communication, they found that these biases reflected and perpetuated biases 
within the ideologies of the society as a whole. For instance, Irigaray often discussed the ils/elles 
distinction in French, and the fact that any group of people including even one man was- 
according to conventional, prescriptivist grammar- referred to with the masculine plural pronoun 
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ils, even if it was a group of a hundred women and one man. Other examples included the lack of 
specific job titles for women that would be equivalent to men’s job titles (le docteur vs. la 
docteur). She believed that this prioritization of the masculine in French reflected a deep-rooted 
ideological misogyny in the society (Bora 109). She also conducted substantial empirical 
research into linguistic biases and language use, particularly that of women, and found that even 
women preferred a masculine pronoun in the active subject position in French (Bora 109).  
Her studies also found that the third-person feminine pronouns elle and elles were much 
less frequently used than their masculine counterparts in general; one of her empirical studies 
found that many mother-daughter interactions were in the imperative, a mood which does not 
require or permit the use of a subject in French, further reducing the use of elle and elles (Bora 
98). She also discussed biases she noticed in which nouns were assigned a feminine grammatical 
gender (Bora 92). For instance, in Je, tu, nous, Irigaray argues that nouns considered more 
important have been assigned masculine gender, such as those that have higher value in the 
society or those that describe living, animate objects rather than inanimate, uncultured objects 
(Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 70). She notes that, though the words for the moon and the stars have been 
assigned feminine gender, the sun, considered the true source of life, takes the masculine 
(Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 31). Though she does not propose that Francophones somehow do away 
with the use of grammatical gender, which constitutes an integral part of the language, she does 
wish to valorize and emphasize the female pronouns, making them more frequently used in order 
to counteract the biases that speakers have developed in favor of the masculine and condition 
them to hearing female pronouns in general, and particularly as active subjects. Irigaray states 
that grammatical gender is “neither motiveless nor arbitrary” when discussing the issue of ils vs. 
elles as well as what nouns are assigned masculine gender while others are assigned feminine 
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gender (Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 20). The French feminist movement focused on the ways that the 
patriarchal order of the society in which they were living was constructed by the the society 
itself, and the immense role that language played in this construction as it shaped people’s 
realities and perceptions (Bora 85). 
In her 1996 book J’aime à toi (‘I love to you’), Irigaray details some of the quantitative 
experiments she has done to examine this crucial relationship between language and cultural 
values, particularly focusing on the gender bias she believes exists in French. In one experiment, 
she simply gave participants a noun (such as chien, ‘dog’, the example she gives in her book) 
and asked them to create a sentence that used this word. She found that, in the case of chien, only 
15% of women and 14% of men used elle when given this simple request to construct a random 
sentence. Results varied somewhat depending on the noun provided to the participants, but 
regardless of the noun or the participant’s gender, the proportion of people using il remained 
much higher than the proportion of people using elle. Irigaray also found that, when participants 
did use elle, it tended to be with certain verbs: verbs relating to nurturing a child, as well as 
negative verbs such as perdu (‘lost’) or renie (‘denied’), tended to receive a feminine subject 
more often (Irigaray, I love to you 70). These results indicate that both men and women, by the 
time of adulthood, gravitate towards a masculine subject more than a feminine subject in entirely 
neutral situations such as the one Irigaray created for the experiment. (She also notes that, in 
some cases, researchers did not inform participants that the noun provided, such as chien, should 
form part of the complement rather than filling the subject role itself, and in these cases, many 
participants did use the noun as the subject rather than any pronoun.) Furthermore, her research 
suggests that participants avoid using elle and elle se (‘she herself’) and their plural equivalents 
as active subjects, regardless of the gender of the participant. These findings held even in cases 
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where the cues led the participant towards a feminine subject, such as when the prompt asked 
them to create a sentence with the words “robe-se-voir” (‘dress-see onself/to be visible’). 
Participants commonly used robe or even il as the subject, giving responses such as Il se voit 
déjà en robe d’avocat (‘He can already see himself in lawyer’s robes’) or La robe se voit bien 
(‘The dress stands out’).  
In her research, Irigaray also found that the vast majority of both men and women 
interpreted the ambiguous indirect object pronoun lui (‘he/she’) to indicate a masculine object in 
the example sentences researchers gave them (Irigaray, I love to you 72-3). In Je, tu, nous, 
Irigaray outlines all of these findings and more, interpreting them as support for her 
aforementioned belief that French speakers favor masculine pronouns in active subject positions, 
and even in object positions in cases where the pronoun is ambiguous. This analysis goes further, 
drawing a connection to cultural values, as the author states that this grammatical bias reflects 
the values- and in particular, the misogyny- of her society, serving as evidence of the way that 
society devalues women themselves as well as anything considered feminine. These quantitative 
findings and the conclusions Irigaray drew from them only strengthened her belief that women 
needed a new, more feminine variety of writing in order to better communicate and avoid using 
the corrupted, masculine language that society favored. 
Various writers had different conceptions of what feminine writing entailed, how it 
would differ from traditional language, and even the definition of femininity. However, differing 
ideas about écriture feminine have themes in common: this new feminine writing would give 
women a better way to express themselves, which these writers believed the old style of 
language did not allow, and would give women better self-image, as they would be freed from 
the ways that the subjective, traditional style of language often disadvantaged women. The 
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traditional style of language had been used to oppress and negatively represent women for too 
long, and now they wanted women to write themselves into the text, creating opportunities to 
express themselves and their experiences in the world- as well as the female experience in 
general- in as authentic a way as possible. In contrast to traditional language with its specific 
meaning and highly-structured syntax, women’s language was supposed to be more fluid and 
flexible, and not as easily pinned down to one particular meaning. In her article “Le rire de la 
Meduse”, Cixous says, “Woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women 
to writing ... Women must put herself into the text - as into the world and into history - by her 
own movement” (Cixous, “Le rire de la Meduse” 875). Irigaray, for her part, argues for the 
plurality of meaning in this new feminine language by stating that order, coherence, and unity of 
meaning have been valued because this in fact reflects the male body, where sexual pleasure is 
concentrated in one organ; now, she states, women must create a language that parallels their 
own experiences instead, with a multiplicity of meaning that reflects the multiplicity of the 
sexual pleasure the female body can experience in various organs (Bora 127). Such sentiments 
demonstrate that this new language was meant to combat the ways that language had erased or 
devalued the female experience for centuries. The purpose of women’s language was to break 
the cycle of patriarchal discourse, as Irigaray believed that continuing to speak the same 
language as men- indeed, the same language that had been spoken for centuries as women had 
consistently held an inferior place in patriarchal societies- would doom women to repeat the past 
rather than create progress or change (Costello 45). She and other French feminist writers 
theorized that they could alter and reshape the world around them by altering the way people 
communicated about it. They concerned themselves with particular aspects of communication- 
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such as representation and discourse- that had previously been, in large part, the domain of men 
(Bora 8).  
Cixous and Irigaray became the writers most closely associated with the more abstract, 
lyrical style of writing that they not only conceptualized, but also embodied in their own works. 
For instance, when discussing the strain on mother-daughter relationships, which she often 
discusses as having suffered under the patriarchy, Irigaray writes this in her article “Et l’un ne 
bouge pas sans l’autre” (‘And the One Doesn’t Stir without the Other’): 
A little light enters me. Something inside me begins to stir. Barely. Something new has   
moved me. As though I’d taken a first step inside myself. As if a breath of air had  
penetrated a completely petrified being, unsticking its mass. Waking me from a long  
sleep. From an ancient dream. A dream which must not have been my own, but in which 
I was captive. Was I a participant, or was I the dream itself- another’s dream, a dream 
about another? (Irigaray, “And the One Doesn’t Stir without the Other” 60-61) 
 
This passage demonstrates the style of Irigaray and many other French feminists, more 
poetic, abstract, and less directly tied to one specific meaning; passages like this allow for a great 
deal of interpretation from the reader. Such use of lyrical style and creation of women’s language 
vs. men’s language function as a way for these women writers to distinguish and separate their 
experiences from men’s experiences, which were typically treated as the norm. The use of 
women’s language was meant to establish and draw attention to the fact that women experienced 
the world differently than men: men’s experiences were not the “default” or only experiences, 
nor should they be the only experiences that are valued or considered valid by society. Irigaray’s 
term for the way society universalized the male experience while ignoring sexual difference- as 
evidenced in language by the use of terms such as “mankind”- was hommosexual, combining the 
Greek homo (‘same’) with the French homme (‘man’) to create a new term expressing how 
society prioritized men’s experiences through this erasure of sexual difference, thus “sameing” 
women at the same time as it othered them (Johnston 619). Irigaray argues that women must 
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recognize and emphasize their difference in order to counteract this hommosexuality and achieve 
a subjective status in society that is equal to- though not the same as- that as men (Irigaray, “And 
the One Doesn’t Stir without the Other” 50). In regards to what distinguishes parler femme from 
more traditional language, Irigaray focuses on audience and locus as well as fluidity and lack of 
concrete meaning. She describes the syntax of parler femme as difficult to pin down, but lacking 
in subject, object, or other ways to denote ownership (Fuss 70). In her book The Sex That is Not 
One, she states that parler femme is most often used by women among women, as this is 
typically the only place where women are bold enough to use it (Fuss 69). However, she points 
out that, even here, women will sometimes continue to use conventional men’s language, as this 
remains the most common variety of language, and embodies what society has taught people to 
value in a language.   
Cixous and Irigaray draw a distinction between the language that benefits or best 
expresses the experiences of men and language that benefits or best expresses the experiences of 
women. They ascribe characteristics to feminine language that they believe are also commonly 
found in women themselves, as their intention would be for this new feminine language to better 
reflect women and femininity: they intend for the fluidity and lyrical qualities of écriture 
feminine to connect to what is essentially feminine (Bora 10). This new style of language was 
intended to valorize many qualities traditionally associated with women that had been devalued 
in society as a whole. These aims mean there is a need to define the concept of what is 
essentially feminine, particularly in contrast to what is essentially masculine. In the process of 
acknowledging and drawing attention to the distinct category that constitutes femininity, they 
tend to present the concept with a certain homogeneity. This simplifies the process of 
emphasizing how women are different from men in order to discuss certain societal issues facing 
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women in particular, which also allows them to present écriture feminine, explaining who it is 
for, why it is necessary, what qualities it has to distinguish it from other language, and why. 
Writer Marjorie Hass summarizes Irigaray’s approach by saying that she identified radical 
elements of women’s style, showed that the current dominant syntax could not capture these 
radical elements, and then combine these elements into a parler femme that women can 
intentionally, consciously use to communicate in a way that cannot be analyzed with traditional 
methods, but remains helpful and efficient as a means of transmitting and sharing ideas. Another 
writer, Diana Fuss, argues that Irigaray’s intention in focusing on the body- which she thought of 
as the core of what women had in common- was highly strategic. Her aim was not to restrict 
women, but instead, to emphasize what made them women, and a part of them that would always 
be women and could not be taken away from them regardless of the influence of patriarchal 
culture (Fuss 67-68).  
These French feminist writers’ focus on the body did not match all of the scholarship or 
activism of their time: in the 1970s, the general trend of activism moved decidedly towards 
identity politics. Activists began using the term in the 1970s to describe a movement centered 
around taking action in an attempt to achieve social and legal equality for marginalized groups, 
based largely on the activists’ experiences relating to gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, or other 
aspects of identity; this caught on quickly. However, it just as quickly faced heavy criticism from 
the poststructuralist movement. Many found that identity politics ignored less personal issues or 
unknowable aspects of the consciousness, while also reducing a person down to certain aspects 
of their identity, such as race or gender, in a way that unintentionally mirrored the discourse of 
the oppressors (Diamond 64-65). Given this reaction by poststructuralists, it appears unsurprising 
that, despite the growing popularity of identity politics, Irigaray in particular took an almost 
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opposite path, focusing insistently on sexual difference. She found the concept of “the other” 
extremely important, and poststructuralism- following the philosophy of Derrida- took issue with 
the way Cartesian concepts of identity took the emphasis away from the idea of the other, even 
omitting or excluding it; poststructuralist philosophers had used the concept of the other to 
discuss various groups considered outsiders in society, including women. Irigaray found that the 
idea of women being other and different from men could not be ignored when discussing 
feminism or women’s experiences, and she believed focusing on the concept of identity erased or 
negated this aspect of womanhood; one unique and significant focus of poststructuralism was 
“knowing difference in and for itself” (Bora 42-45).  
The concept of écriture feminine has a great deal to do with the female body specifically, 
as the body was conceptualized by the French feminist movement as the root of the differences 
between men and women. Aforementioned philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, an important 
influence on French feminism, emphasized the importance of the body in regards to how one 
interacts with oneself and with the world; Irigaray specifically tied this to language in her own 
work, believing that the exclusion of sexual difference from language, and from patriarchal 
discourses in general, constituted a root cause of oppression (Squires 8). She found that 
language, humans’ main system of communication, should reflect the ways in which humans 
themselves differed, rather than having only one system that she found better served the needs 
and reflected the experiences of men. Irigaray believed that, given what she regarded as crucial 
and essential differences between men and women, a new language would be highly helpful: 
giving women a better way to express themselves would allow better communication between 
men and women. 
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Irigaray further engages with many of these ideas and in her book Je, tu, nous, a work in 
which she lays out many of her thoughts and ideologies regarding language as a crucial cultural 
medium. In the very first chapter, she argues not only for the non-arbitrary nature of feminine vs. 
masculine grammatical gender, but also states that feminine grammatical gender is made to 
“disappear as subjective expression,” most likely referring to the fact that if there is any 
grammatically or naturally masculine presence in a group, prescriptive grammar holds that a 
speaker or writer must use masculine pronouns and adjectives. She finds that a large portion of 
the vocabulary associated with women in languages such as French, her native language, is 
negative, objectifying, and sometimes derogatory. This leads to her conclusion that women need 
écriture feminine, as they are excluded from this patriarchal linguistic order in a way that keeps 
them from being able to speak in a manner that will be seen as coherent and successfully get 
them the attention and respect of those around them (Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 20). Women, argues 
Irigaray, need to escape the restriction of acting as the object of men’s discourse, and require 
language that allows them to discuss themselves, putting the feminine in the subject position. She 
states, “What this means implies is that the female body is not to remain the object of men’s 
discourse or their various arts but that it become the object of a female subjectivity experiencing 
and identifying itself” (Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 59). She examines the question of what type of 
equality women should truly aim for, and finds that they should desire not to possess what men 
possess or have the qualities of men, but instead to maintain their difference and to create an 
equal subjectivity. In recommending this, she envisions a society in which women remain 
entirely distinct from men, but are not considered in any way inferior to men. 
The author believes women who attempt to assert themselves in a conversation in the 
patriarchal linguistic order end up taking a supposedly neutral position, except that in the case of 
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many languages, including French, they in fact take a masculine position, as people have been 
culturally conditioned to consider masculine the “default” or “neutral” position. Thus, she claims 
that women who do this deny their feminine identities. Instead of forcing women into these 
supposedly neutral positions, Irigaray believes language must be free of any rules that attempt to 
restrict or cancel out sexual identity if women truly wish to achieve liberation. She argues that 
this goal must be achieved by examining various languages individually to determine which 
aspects require modification (Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 33). She reiterates that, in French, women 
must remain “among themselves” in order for a plural to be feminine or in order to have a 
relationship to “the subjectively female world” due to the aforementioned French grammatical 
rule that any mixed-gender group is described using masculine pronouns, adjectives, etc. 
(Irigaray, Je, tu, nous 34) She points out while analyzing certain aspects of her own quantitative 
work that even the “it” of sentences such as “it is snowing” or “it is necessary” always uses the 
masculine form in French; she characterizes this as another way in which supposedly “neutral” 
language often has masculine characteristics (Irigaray, Je, tu nous 30). These quantitative 
experiments and emphasis on discussing gender-biased structures and vocabulary within French 
allowed Irigaray to strengthen her argument regarding the presence of patriarchal bias in the 
language, which she further used to lead into her argument for the necessity of a new, particular 
“women’s language.” The French feminists had a rather unique interpretation of the significance 
of language to their society. They focused on bringing attention to the ways in which language 
acted as a highly subjective tool, both reflecting and re-enforcing the misogynistic biases present 
in their society. This linguistic feminism explored the subjectivities of language in new and 
seemingly progressive ways. 
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Much like the anatomical references already addressed, the concept of écriture feminine 
might appear essentialist at first glance, as many have interpreted these writers’ construction of 
this alternate version of language as simply a statement that women have such extreme 
differences from men that they require an entirely different method of communication. However, 
other interpretations of écriture feminine point out that the concept of écriture feminine has deep 
roots in constructionism, meaning it should be viewed through the lens of the same principles as 
French feminists’ discussions of biological sex. The idea of “feminine writing” stems from the 
French feminists’ aforementioned firm belief in language as a method of constructing, and not 
merely reflecting, reality. Indeed, they did not necessarily believe in an objective, unmediated 
“reality” for language to reflect. Without this crucial tenet of their philosophy, the language 
used- by women in particular- to express thoughts, feelings, and experiences would not form 
such a meaningful part of French feminist arguments. Language matters to these writers because 
of its power to either maintain the status quo or create change. Some have accused French 
feminists of embodying gynocriticism, a form of literary analysis focusing exclusively on work 
by female authors in a framework based around women, taking no other viewpoints into account. 
However, Costello points out that true adherents to the gynocriticism movement, which also 
existed in academia, did not believe language merited as much attention as French feminists gave 
it, because the gynocentric theorists characterized language- where they specifically considered it 
at all- as simply an objective, adequate way of accurately representing women’s experiences. 
Some scholars have, in fact, used French feminism as a way of explicitly criticizing 
gynocriticism’s biological understanding of sex and dependence on the author’s biological sex; 
Costello argues that the redefinition of sexual difference as linguistic, rather than biological, and 
avoidance of biological essentialism attracted many feminist U.S. literary critics to the approach 
	 49 
taken by French feminism, contrary to the popular opinion that French feminism actually 
embodies essentialism (Costello 24-25, 28). The idea of feminine writing played an important 
part in this linguistic interpretation of sexual difference, which differentiated French feminism 
from earlier or differing sects of feminism, and in fact allowed it to distance itself from 
biological essentialism.  
Despite accusations to the contrary, an anti-essentialist interpretation of French feminist 
works and ideology is not merely possible, but plausible. Many have pointed to the distinct 
“female” language of écriture feminine or various anatomical references to assert that these 
works rely too heavily on biology to explain gender roles, discounting the movement for using 
counterproductive or exclusionary strategies. However, other critics have found that scholars can 
read the work as presenting a view diametrically opposed to such biological essentialism, and 
indeed many of French feminism’s supporters value it precisely because of the way it distances 
itself from essentialist approaches due to writers’ insistence on constructionism throughout every 
aspect of their discussions. Readers must view the approaches taken in these works by Irigaray 
and her fellow writers through the lens of the particular historical and philosophical context in 
which they wrote in order to account for how these arguments arose in the form that they did; 
this allows scholars to accept possible anti-essentialist interpretations of the work produced by 
this movement and avoid overlooking nuances of the work that do not align with the accusations 
of biological essentialism that the movement has historically attracted. Indeed, the French 
feminist movement attracted not only accusations of essentialism, but also accusations that these 
writers were not feminists at all. As earlier stated, some of these writers do not attach this label to 
themselves, and certain groups which had many prominent French feminist writers among their 
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membership, such as Psych et po, did criticize the movement on the grounds of their belief that 
feminists simply adopted masculinity or wanted to emulate men (Moses 249).  
This antifeminist argument does appear to align with Irigaray’s belief that women, while 
attempting to achieve equal status to men, should never attempt to become more similar to them, 
given that this group had filled the role of the oppressor in many patriarchal societies for 
centuries. However, thoroughly responding to the question of whether readers should consider 
these writers feminists requires further examination, including a definition of the term 
“feminist.” In examining this issue, I prefer the definition of the term used by Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie: “Feminist: a person who believes in the social, political, and economic equality 
of the sexes” (Adizie, Chimamanda Ngozi). According to this definition, I would argue that the 
French feminists do, in fact, merit the label of feminist. Though many of them do not tend to 
assign themselves this label, the arguments presented appear to center only on the strategies 
espoused by the mainstream feminist movement as they encountered it. Additionally, many of 
those across various groups fighting for liberation and equality during the 1970s, spanning a 
variety of ideologies, did not wish to associate themselves with the official mainstream 
movement, as it dealt with a great deal of infighting and other issues leading to a lack of 
cooperation among different groups (Greenwald 86). The label “feminist” still brought up highly 
contentious issues in France at the time. French feminists were not alone in disavowing the label, 
and their work makes clear that they did, in fact, share mainstream feminists’ goal of social, 
political, and economic equality of the sexes, despite disagreeing with the mainstream movement 
over how exactly to achieve this goal. Like the form of their arguments, their choice to distance 
themselves from the mainstream feminist movement in certain ways should be seen in its 
particular political, social, and historical context. The shared goal of equality holds more weight 
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than the smaller, more complicated matter of which labels they chose to adopt for themselves. 
Additionally, in light of the philosophical background previously outlined, it is evident that the 
ideology of French feminism has deep roots in constructionism, placing emphasis on the 
importance of sociohistorical context rather than nature; this contradicts Delphy’s 
aforementioned argument that the French feminists did not deserve the label of feminist because 
they treated gender as explainable by some natural “essence” rather than by societal construction, 
making their approach or beliefs incompatible with those of contemporary feminism. I argue that 
the French feminists should in fact be considered feminists in light of this constructionist 
context, readings of their works that do align with the tenets of today’s feminism, and, most 
importantly, the core goal of equality, which they share with other feminists across a wide 
variety of time periods and locations.  
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Chapter 3 
Transgenderism & the Implications of French Feminist Ideology Today  
 A great number of the core French feminist texts discussed here, and associated with the 
movement in general, were published in the 1970s. Many of the most well-known French 
feminist writers no longer publish new work, and of course, the feminist movement and its 
approaches to accomplishing the goal of equality have continued to grow and change over the 
course of the last four decades. This begs the question of whether the ideologies outlined by 
French feminists in their own work have stood the test of time, and what feminist theorists and 
activists today can take from their ideas in order to incorporate aspects of this movement into 
today’s feminism. Irigaray’s focus on sexual difference has made her work a topic of much 
contention in queer theory, particularly in regards to the discussion of transgender, intersex, and 
gender-nonconforming people (often abbreviated as TIGNC). Many in this field have pointed out 
the cissexism of arguing for two unchangeable categories, “male” and “female,” based solely on 
sex, and presenting these as essential facts of human existence (Johnston 618). This leaves no 
room for any sort of movement between, or simply existing between, the two categories, which 
does not seem to allow for an Irigarayan discussion of the TIGNC experience. Irigaray has also 
received criticism from queer theorists for prioritizing heterosexual couples in her work, as she 
finds that a couple who exists across this most crucial difference is the most “creative and 
mysterious” (Johnston 619).  
 Queer theorist Tim Johnston, however, argues that one must take into account that 
Irigaray’s conception of heterosexuality does not match the current accepted societal definition, 
as a heterosexual relationship in a world where the two sexes are entirely equal would differ 
greatly from the heterosexual relationship as we currently understand it. Altering gender roles 
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would, by necessity, greatly alter relationships as well. He also argues for this as another reason 
that scholars should not consider Irigaray an essentialist, as her work does not glorify or advocate 
for the maintenance of gender roles as they currently stand; instead, she imagines an entirely new 
future, certain implications of which one cannot fully understand when reading her ideas in the 
context of the current dominant hommosexual point of view (Johnston 622). Her explanation of 
the proposed phrase “I love to you,” which is also the title of one of her books, demonstrates this, 
as she says, “I love to you means I maintain a relation of indirection to you. I do not subjugate or 
consume you” (Irigaray, I love to you 109). She further elaborates, “The ‘to’ prevents the relation 
of transitivity, bereft of the other’s irreducibility or potential reciprocity” (Irigaray, I love to you 
109). Irigaray outlines a concept of a new variety of relationship, where no one finds themselves 
in the role of the object, and the dynamic between the parties is equal in more ways than the 
current patriarchal structure could allow for, and ways that may even at first seem difficult to 
comprehend in readers’ own current sociocultural contexts; thus, she does not merely reduce 
people to their current gender roles, but instead theorizes entirely new ones, meaning that 
scholars can analyze and use her work today without having concerns over cissexism or 
heterosexism.   
 Reconciling Irigaray’s ideology with an acceptance of TIGNC identities proves a more 
difficult task. She argues that ontology (the philosophical study of being, existence or reality) is 
sexed, and finds that arguing for ontological multiplicity actually aligns with the logic of the one, 
or the hommosexuality she wishes to overcome; she views it as this logic of the one, merely 
divided up into many individuals (Johnston 624). According to her belief, multiplicity cannot 
sufficiently challenge this dominant ideology: only acknowledging the two sexes and the 
differences between them will allow changes leading to a better experience for women and the 
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creation of the better future she envisions. Some have reconciled this by arguing that, because 
Irigaray conceptualizes sexual difference as the source of many other sociological differences, 
she could perhaps have also believed that other differences- including other types of sexual 
difference- would come after society had been restructured to emphasize sexual difference as she 
imagined; this would mean that restructuring society in this way would, at some point, improve 
the lives of TIGNC individuals as well. Upon close reading of Irigaray’s work, however, this 
appears somewhat implausible, and most likely not the writer’s intended meaning. In fact, she 
believes the concept of transgender or intersex identities simply constitutes one more way of 
ignoring or destroying sexual difference, saying this on the topic:  
Some of our prosperous or naïve contemporaries, women and men, would like to wipe 
out this difference by resorting to monosexuality, to the unisex and to what is called 
identification: even if I am bodily a man or woman, I can identify with, and so be, the 
other sex. This new opium of the people annihilates the other in the illusion of a 
reduction to identity, equality and sameness, especially between man and woman, the 
ultimate anchorage of real alterity. (Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One 61-62) 
 
Thus, rather than challenging the logic of the one, she finds that transgender and intersex 
identities form a part of the problem, and certainly do not fit into her vision of a sexual 
difference-based society, which has little room for the concept of personal identification. Grosz 
states that Irigaray does not believe it possible for an individual to truly be a member of a sex 
that they were not assigned at birth, regardless of that person’s personal identification, surgical 
intervention, or other “altering” of the body (Johnston 626). This aligns with transphobic ideas 
that transgender individuals still “really” belong to the sex they were assigned at birth.  
A definition of sex as a social construct has formed an important part of the mainstream 
U.S. feminist discussion on sex in more recent years. In Myra J. Hird’s book Sex, Gender, and 
Science, she outlines the history of the concept of sex, demonstrating that, though many people 
assume that sex is merely a biological fact, the meaning of biological sex has in fact changed a 
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great deal over time. Prior to the eighteenth century, common belief held that men and women 
shared one morphological body, with male and female “seed” struggling for dominance in each 
person’s body. Thus, a person could fall anywhere on the single axis, with femininity at one 
extreme and masculinity at the other, depending on various physical and behavioral traits; in fact, 
there are various records in medical literature of people changing their sex during this time 
period (Hird 18-19). Concepts of sexual difference first gained strength in the field of botany, 
and scientists increasingly began to apply them to various types of beings as the field of biology 
emerged during the Enlightenment. Rather than one particular discovery overturning the long-
held idea of sex as a single axis, this occurred as a series of shifts, particularly as anatomists 
began to- sometimes publicly- dissect the body and examine individual organs in ways that had 
not previously been possible or acceptable. Political shifts also accompanied these new 
approaches to examining biology, as the idea of “sexual difference” took hold and became a 
politically expedient way to explain why women must remain subservient even in the wake of 
the Enlightenment, with its focus on equality: women were simply, by nature, suited for differing 
things than men, now occupying an entirely different scale than men rather than falling 
somewhere along the same axis (Hird 22-23). Such ideas clearly took a strong hold on Western 
society and have shaped societal concepts of sex, gender, and relationships; feminists in recent 
years have called attention to the fact that this conception of sex is not “natural,” as many have 
assumed, but instead just as societally constructed as societal ideas of gender.  
Irigaray does not necessarily provide a firm definition of each sex to explain what it 
means to be a woman or how an individual knows their own sex, but instead shifts away from a 
definition of women as “not-men” to a definition of women based entirely on sexual difference, 
without explaining what exactly sexual difference entails. This allows the discussion of sexual 
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difference to remain open-ended, leaving space for the interaction of constantly-changing social, 
biological, political, and other factors (Ugrina 53). However, this open-endedness might at first 
seem troubling for feminists who attempt to make use of French feminist ideology today: though 
Irigaray wrote of a theoretical future and did not wish for readers to interpret her work in terms 
of the current definitions of femininity and masculinity, the lack of a definition for sexual 
difference allows for interpretations that do align with contemporary gender roles, which could 
perhaps have contributed to the common accusations of French feminist essentialism (Johnston 
628). On the other hand, when attempting to garner a definition of sex from these works, one 
must still take into account that the French feminists based their ideology entirely in 
construction. Given that they followed Derrida’s theory that “there is no ‘the’ body,” the French 
feminists fully acknowledged that language and sociohistorical context mediated everything, 
including the body. For this reason, it seems somewhat unusual for Irigaray to take the viewpoint 
that she does in regards to transgender and intersex issues: after all, if gender and the body are 
both constructions, then it would seem to logically follow that they would have a somewhat fluid 
nature that could potentially change. However, given the viewpoint presented in her own words 
above, this appears to be a sticking point for Irigaray, as she takes a rather rigid, not necessarily 
constructionist stance on the matter.  
It therefore seems that neither society’s current hommosexual structure, nor Irigaray’s 
version of sexual difference, allows for TIGNC experiences, even finding these identities 
complicit with monosexuality and sometimes denying the existence of such individuals 
(Johnston 628). Under this approach, such experiences and individuals exist only in the imagined 
improved future where perhaps reconstructing society around sexual difference could help to 
allow other differences, including other types of sexual difference, to flourish as well. This 
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particularly applies to and causes problems for those whose identities do not fit into the extant 
gender binary at all, as Irigaray’s version of sexual difference hinges on and derives meaning 
from the two sexes remaining distinct. This belief proves a rather difficult obstacle to overcome 
in applying certain aspects of French feminist ideology to today’s mainstream U.S. feminist 
movement. Some have argued that queer theory can only cooperate with feminism insofar as 
they both conceive sex, sexuality, and gender as separable but interrelated (Ugrina 58). Irigaray’s 
views on transgender issues appear to link the body and her conceptualization of sex too closely 
with gender, not allowing for the identity of a person whose gender identity does not match the 
sex they were assigned at birth, or those who fall entirely outside of the binary in terms of either 
gender or sexual characteristics.  
Overall, I argue that certain aspects of Irigaray’s work can, in fact, still prove useful for 
mainstream feminists today, as it is both possible and beneficial to interpret Irigaray’s work in an 
anti-essentialist light. Thus, feminists can make use of certain aspects of her interesting ideas on 
the “sameness and othering” of women and sexual difference, among other things. However, her 
ideas on TIGNC individuals prove rather challenging to reconcile with today’s mainstream 
feminism, and risk adoption by trans-exclusionary radical feminists in order to further exclusive, 
anti-transgender rhetoric that does not align with the ideal of equality or other goals of today’s 
mainstream feminist movement. Because Irigaray does not acknowledge transgender identities as 
valid despite her belief that the body is in fact a construction, feminists seeking to use her ideas 
today should have an awareness of this issue in her work and acknowledge it when necessary, 
perhaps adapting the ideology in their own work to present a more inclusive viewpoint that better 
aligns with the feminism of today. However, today’s academic feminist writers can and should 
still make use of many aspects of French feminism’s unique approach to the field, as an anti-
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essentialist interpretation can allow these works to remain relevant and valuable for today’s 
feminism. 
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Conclusion 
 The question of how to define “woman” and address “women’s issues” has, of course, 
produced innumerable answers, all with their own vehement defenders. In the 1980s, the novel, 
psychoanalytically-based approach of the particular group of writers known as the French 
feminists caught the attention of certain scholars and spread quickly through American 
academia, as they attempted to carefully balance a definition of woman that would neither be too 
general, thus ahistorical and out of the proper sociopolitical context, nor too narrow to truly 
define “women.” Since then, the contributions of Luce Irigaray and the French feminist 
movement have proved highly contentious for several decades, and their ideas seem to have 
struck a chord among those fighting for women’s liberation. This group of writers made highly 
interesting use of linguistic feminism and the constructionism that grew increasingly popular in 
French philosophy during the time period in which they worked, drawing attention to the ways 
that language constructs reality, including the continued oppression of marginalized groups such 
as women. Irigaray’s quantitative experiments allowed her to demonstrate the bias inherent in 
French, her native language, as an example, and led her towards her imaginative conception of 
écriture feminine and a new, more equal variety of relationship between men and women, 
outside of society’s current patriarchal and hommosexual structure. The French feminists 
emphasized a definition of women as women, attempting to create a definition based on an 
essence that could not be taken from women by patriarchal oppression. While this approach has 
attracted criticism and claims of essentialism, much like Irigaray’s anatomical references, these 
ideas can and should lead to an anti-essentialist rather than essentialist interpretation given the 
constructionist philosophical context of the work, which allows feminists today to continue using 
certain aspects of the work without concerns over accusations of essentialism, though they 
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should avoid espousing those of Irigaray’s ideas which contradict the doctrine of constructionism 
and invalidate the identities of intersex, transgender, and non-gender-conforming individuals, not 
aligning with contemporary feminism’s rather more inclusionary stance. In addition, much of 
French feminists’ work centers around theory rather than activism, meaning that today’s 
feminists could certainly do further work in applying those still-relevant aspects of this ideology 
to the practical issues of the contemporary world. 
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